Could You Repeat That Please? Forty-Five Years of Pesticide Experiments on People by Leiterman, Barbara
Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 19
Number 1 Winter 2013 Article 12
1-1-2013
Could You Repeat That Please? Forty-Five Years of
Pesticide Experiments on People
Barbara Leiterman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara Leiterman, Could You Repeat That Please? Forty-Five Years of Pesticide Experiments on People, 19 Hastings West Northwest J. of
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 195 (2013)
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol19/iss1/12
 
195 
Could You Repeat That Please?  Forty-Five years of 
Pesticide Experiments on People 
Barbara Leiterman* 
I. Introduction
II. Testing Pesticides on People
A. The Children’s Environmental Exposure Study (CHEERS)
1. CHEERS is Cancelled
2. CHEERS Exemplifies Ethical Quandaries in the Field
B. Pesticide Tests on People between 1967 and 2004
III. Is it Possible to Ethically Test Pesticides on People?
A. The Agricultural Health Study
B. The Endosulfan Study
IV. The Laws and Regulations that Govern Pesticides
A. FIFRA, FFDCA, and FOPA
B. Human Health Risk Assessments
C. Incentives to test Pesticides on People
V. Conclusion
I. Introduction
In October of 2004 approximately thirty Florida parents were offered
$970.00, a camcorder, a bib, and a t-shirt in exchange for the right to 
measure the development of their young children who were exposed to 
household chemicals and pesticides on a routine basis.1  The children were 
exposed to household chemicals through furniture or fabric in their homes 
that contained the chemicals2 and they were exposed to pesticides through 
* The author would like to extend gratitude to Michael H. Surgan of the New
York Attorney General’s Office, Professor Sheila Foster of Fordham
University School of Law, David Resnik of the National Institutes of Health,
David S. Egilman of Brown University, and Aaron Colangelo of the Natural
Resources Defense Council for their time and expertise.  Appreciation is also
due to Olivia Kim for her exquisite editing.  Lastly, the author would like to
thank Dean Irma Russell of University of Montana Law School for leading by
example, and for suggesting many years ago that I get this published.
1. Kirkpatrick, E.P.A. Halts Florida Test on Pesticides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2005, at A15; Michael Janofsky, Nominee Challenged Over Program On Pesticides, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at A19. 
2. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; Janofsky, supra note 1.
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routine application of household pesticides in their homes.3  The 
recruitment of test subjects for this study was the beginning of the 
Children’s Environmental Exposure Study, otherwise known as CHEERS.4  
In order to participate in CHEERS, the families involved needed to live 
in Duval County, Florida, have children less than one year of age,5 and “spray 
[] pesticides inside [their] home routinely.”6  Subsequently, families that 
signed up to participate agreed to allow the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to monitor the development of their children for 
the next two years.7 
CHEERS will serve as an introduction to the practical and ethical 
quandaries of testing pesticides on people.  The story of its cancellation will 
be examined, as it reveals not only the lack of public knowledge of this field, 
but also the dangers exacerbated by this lack of public knowledge.  Part I 
(Section II) will describe pesticide tests on people that occurred between 
1967 and 2004 for products aimed at the American market, and the ethical 
violations found within those experiments.   
Part II (Section III) will explore two pesticide tests on people since 
2005: the Agricultural Health Study and the Endosulfan Study.  Both 
experiments share many of the qualities of good science.  In fact, they may 
represent ethical tests of pesticides on people.  However, they also raise the 
deeper questions of consent and necessity implicit in pesticide tests on 
people. 
Part III (Section IV) will briefly analyze some of the laws and 
regulations that govern pesticides in the United States, focusing on their 
relationship with pesticide tests on people.  In general, when this article 
refers to pesticide tests on people, it is referring to those tests whose results 
were submitted, or were intended to be submitted, to U.S. regulators.  Part 
III will also describe human health risk assessments, and incentives for 
testing pesticides on people.  
II. Testing Pesticides on People
A. The Children’s Environmental Exposure Study (CHEERS)
The Children’s Environmental Exposure Research Study (“CHEERS”) 
was designed to study the effects, if any, of the pesticides DEET and 
pyrethrin, as well as phthalates, brominated flame-retardants, and 
3. Janofsky, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.
7. Id.; see Juliet Eilperin, Chemical Industry Funds Aid EPA Study: Effect of
Substances on Children Probed, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at A23. 
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perfluorinated compounds on children between birth and three years of 
age.8  Phthalates, brominated flame-retardants, and perfluorinated 
compounds are all commonly found in modern household products.9 
Brominate flame retardants are “found in polyurethane foam products, foam 
padding in furniture, textiles, electrical appliances, televisions and 
computers.”10  Regarding phthalates, “80–90% of [p]hthalates are used in 
8. Eilperin, supra note 7, at 23; see also Kara Sissell, EPA Cancels
Controversial Children’s Health Study, CHEM. WEEK, Apr. 20, 2005, at 27. 
Before CHEERS was proposed, the following was already known by the U.S. 
government regarding the health risks of some of the chemicals being 
studied:  
In 2001 the Department of Health and Human Services described the 
pesticide group pyrethrins interfering with nerve and brain function. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances & 
Disease Registry, ToxFAQs for Pyrethrins and Pyrethroids, http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20030417165632/http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts155.html (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2012). 
Pyrethrins and pyrethroids interfere with the normal way that the nerves 
and brain function.  Exposure to very high levels of these compounds for 
a short period in air, food, or water may cause dizziness, headache, 
nausea, muscle twitching, reduced energy, changes in awareness, 
convulsions and loss of consciousness.  Changes in mental state may 
last several days after exposure to high levels of pyrethroids has ended. 
Id. 
The same webpage also addressed the effect of pyrethrins on children:  
 It is likely that health effects seen in children exposed to high levels 
of pyrethrins or pyrethroids will be similar to the effects seen in adults. 
We do not know whether children differ from adults in their 
susceptibility to these chemicals.  Id.  Birth defects have not been 
observed in humans exposed to pyrethrins or pyrethroids. Offspring of 
animals that ingested pyrethrins or pyrethroids while pregnant showed 
signs of possible damage to the immune system. Some animals that 
were exposed to pyrethrins or pyrethroids right after birth showed 
altered behavior as adults.  Id. 
9. PAT COSTNER ET AL., SICK OF DUST: CHEMICALS IN COMMON PRODUCTS A
NEEDLESS HEALTH THREAT IN OUR HOMES (2005), available at http://www.clean 
production.org/library/Dust%20Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
10. COSTNER, supra note 9, at 11; see also LINDA S. BIRNBAUM & DANIELE F. 
STASKAL, BROMINATED FLAME RETARDANTS: CAUSE FOR CONCERN? 12 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1, 9-10 (2004) available at http://www.nc 
bi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241790/pdf/ehp0112-000009.pdf (last visit-
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flexible PVC (vinyl) products such as wall coverings, flooring, furniture, 
shower curtains, clothing, raincoats, shoes, and toys.”11  And lastly, the 
perfluorinated compound PFOA is “used to make Teflon, Goretex, and . . . 
materials that are used in . . . nonstick frying pans, utensils, stove hoods, 
stain proofed carpets, furniture, and clothes.”12  
CHEERS was to be funded by the EPA and the American Chemistry 
Council (“ACC”).13  The ACC is a trade group of American chemical 
corporations including pesticide manufacturers.14  To help fund the study, 
the EPA accepted two million dollars from the ACC.15   
CHEERS aimed to recruit sixty test subject families.16  The parents or 
guardians of the test subjects in those families would be instructed to video-
tape their babies and/or young children (hereinafter “children”), collect urine 
samples from their children, attach “activity sensors” to them for one week 
every three to six months17 and allow two EPA researchers to visit their 
ed Oct. 9, 2012).  Note that while Costner uses the term “brominate flame 
retardants” and Birnbaum & Staskal use the term “brominated flame 
retardants,” their descriptions of the chemicals and the uses of those 
chemicals make it evident that they are referring to the same class of 
chemicals. 
11. COSTNER, supra note 9, at 11.
12. Id.  Costner and her co-authors reported on a study of dust
samples taken from 70 homes in seven U.S. states.  They found that “[a]ll 
composite samples were contaminated by all six of the chemical classes we 
investigated: phthalates, pesticides, alkylphenols, brominated flame 
retardants, organotins and perfluorinated compounds.”  Id. at 5. 
13. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Janofsky, supra note 1.
14. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.
15. Id.; see also Eilperin, supra note 7, at 23.  However the Organic
Consumers website lists the ACC’s contribution as 2.1 million.  ORGANIC
CONSUMERS, EPA & Chemical Industry To Study Effects Of Known Toxic Chemicals On 
Children: Study Launch Date Suspended Until Summer 2005, Offers Public Comment 
Period, http://www.organicconsumers.org/epa-alert.htm  (last visited Aug. 13, 
2011).   
The two million dollars accepted from the American Chemistry Council 
helped fund a study that was expected to cost nine million dollars in total. 
Johanna Neuman, Acting EPA Chief Withdraws Controversial Pesticide Project; 
Canceling the Study on Children Clears the Way for a Senate Vote on His Nod to Head 
the Agency, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at A31.  
16. Eilperin, supra note 7, at 23.
17. Videotape: Senator Barbara Boxer, Press Conference of Senator Bill
Nelson and Senator Barbara Boxer at the Senate Radio/TV Gallery: EPA’s 
Children’s Environmental Exposure Research Study and Nomination of 
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homes up to four times a year for the duration of the two-year study.18  The 
EPA and the ACC would use the videotapes, urine samples, sensor data, and 
researchers’ observations to study the development of the children in these 
families.  The children would be studied in order to measure the effects of 
pesticide and household chemical exposure on their developing bodies.19  It 
appears that the parents or guardians of the test subjects would receive the 
promised money, clothing, and video camera only after fulfilling their 
obligations to the study for the full two years.20 
Pesticide tests on people can be roughly divided between 
observational tests and intentional dosage tests.  An observational test is 
one where “researchers collect data on exposures that occur in the course of 
routine activities.”21  An intentional dosage test is one where human test 
subjects are intentionally given a specific dose of a substance (for example 
five milligrams of a pesticide in a pill, an injection, or an inhaled vapor).22  
Can CHEERS be considered an observational study? 23  The CHEERS 
test subjects lived in environments where, theoretically, they were already 
exposed to the chemicals being studied and their exposure was not 
intended to change as a result of the study.  Arguably, proposing to take 
blood samples and attach activity sensors to the test subject children may 
take CHEERS out of the realm of observational testing.  Whether or not 
CHEERS was a purely observational test, it was not an intentional dosage 
test because the test subjects were not intentionally given a specific dose of 
a substance.  These distinctions are necessary when delving into the ethics 
of experimentation on people. 
Stephen Johnson to be EPA Administrator (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
18. Id.
19. Janofsky, supra note 1.
20. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.  David B. Resnik agrees that parents of
test subjects “could remain in the study even if they decided to reduce or 
eliminate their pesticides use; they would also be free to withdraw from the 
study at any time.”  David B. Resnik, Lessons Learned From the Children’s 
Environmental Exposure Research Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 414, 415 (Mar. 
2007).    
21. Id.
22. The Code of Federation Regulation defines intentional exposure
research on humans as “a study of a substance in which the exposure to the 
substance experienced by a human subject participating in the study would 
not have occurred but for the human subject’s participation in the study.” 
40 C.F.R. § 26.1102(i). 
23. Resnik, supra note 20, at 415.
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Six health clinics and three hospitals in Jacksonville, Florida were 
chosen as recruitment sites for CHEERS.24  According to the study’s 
proposal, “[a]lthough all Duval County citizens are eligible to use the [health 
care] centers, [the clinics and hospitals] primarily serve individuals with 
lower incomes.  In the year 2000, seventy five percent of the users of the 
clinics for pregnancy issues were at or below the poverty level.”25  The 
national poverty level for a family of four in 2005 was $19,157.00.26   
The compensation offered to the parents of CHEERS test subjects (a 
video camera, $960.00 cash, and a t-shirt and bib) may seem like small 
compensation to some.  The Acting Administrator for the Human Exposure 
and Atmospheric Sciences Division of the EPA’s Office of Research and 
Development said that it was unlikely that anyone would volunteer for 
CHEERS out of financial need27 and that “[n]obody can go into this study 
just for that amount of money.”28  However, framing the CHEERS rewards as 
a percentage of the annual budget of the CHEERS recruits reveals that the 
benefits offered ($960.00 cash, two clothing items of minimal value, and a 
video camera with a value of approximately $150.00 = $1,110.00) represent 
approximately seventeen percent of the annual budget of a family of four 
living at the poverty line in 2005.29  Seventeen percent of any person’s 
budget is a considerable incentive. 
Why were clinics and hospitals that primarily serve working class 
people (seventy five percent of the users of the clinics for pregnancy issues 
were at or below the poverty level),30 chosen as recruitment sites?  Some 
researchers believe that low-income test subjects in low-income 
neighborhoods are less likely to “make a fuss” to the public, the press, or 
their political representatives about an environmental risk or siting decision. 
In 1984 a political consulting firm called Cerrell Associates wrote a report for 
24. ORGANIC CONSUMERS, supra note 15; Videotape: Senator Bill Nelson,
Press Conference of Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Barbara Boxer at the 
Senate Radio/TV Gallery: EPA’s Children’s Environmental Exposure Research 
Study and Nomination of Stephen Johnson to be EPA Administrator (Apr. 7, 
2005) (on file with author), supra note 17. 
25. ORGANIC CONSUMERS, supra note 15.
26. David Leonhardt, U.S. Poverty Rate Was Up Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2005. 
27. Juliet Eilperin, EPA to Study Pesticides’ Effect on Kids Spurs Backlash
within Agency, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 31, 2004. 
28. Id.
29. There is at least a 75% chance that the families recruited for
CHEERS were living at or below the poverty line.  ORGANIC CONSUMERS 
(quoting EPA Study Proposal, at 23), supra note 15. 
30. Id.
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the California Waste Management Board.31  The report recommended siting 
waste incinerators in neighborhoods that would “offer the least potential of 
generating public opposition.”32  It described such neighborhoods as: 
[s]mall, rural communities whose residents are low income,
older people, or people with a high school education or less;
communities with a high proportion of Catholic residents . . . . 
Officials and companies should look for lower socioeconomic 
neighborhoods that are also in a heavy industrial area with little, 
if any commercial activity.33 
Fifty-one percent of the births at the medical facilities at which the 
CHEERS test subjects were recruited were to women of color, and sixty-two 
percent of those mothers had ended their education at elementary or 
secondary school.34  The CHEERS proposal also purportedly said “[t]he 
percentage of births to individuals classified as black in the U.S. Census is 
higher at these three hospitals than for the County as a whole.”35  Luke Cole 
and Sheila Foster’s description of the influence of race when choosing toxic 
waste sites is relevant:36  
Rarely does a “smoking gun” – explicit racial criteria or 
motivation – exist behind the decision to locate a toxic waste 
facility in a community of color.  The reasons frequently given by 
companies for siting facilities are that such communities have 
low-cost land, sparse populations, and desirable geological 
attributes.  Notably, however, there is evidence that portions of 
the waste industry target neighborhoods that possess the 
attributes of many poor communities of color, using “race-
neutral criteria.”37 
31. LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2000), reprinted 
in 34 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 70-74  (Clifford 
Rechtschaffen & Eileen Gauna eds., 2002). 
32. Id.
33. ORGANIC CONSUMERS (quoting EPA Study Proposal), supra note 15.
34. Id. (quoting EPA Study Proposal, at 23), supra note 15.
35. Id.
36. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 31, at 70-74.
37. Id. at 35.
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Public policy as it concerns race is subject to strict scrutiny, both 
culturally and politically,38 by sensitized people and communities.39  This is 
one of many reasons why choosing to recruit the CHEERS test subjects from 
health clinics primarily serving less educated working class people of color 
was a poor choice.  However, when looked at in the historical context of 
human testing, it was not necessarily a surprising choice.   
Pesticide testing is a relatively new type of human experimentation, 
born of a culture typified by human rights abuses.40  While some grizzly 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.  The first two definitions of
“discrimination” in Black’s Law Dictionary are: 
1. “The effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a
certain class or that denies privileges to a certain class because of race,
age, sex, nationality, religion or handicap.”
2. “Differential treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when
no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and
those not favored.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009).
39. Harriet A. Washington describes the political and cultural
responses of African Americans to medical experimentation: 
Historically, African Americans have been subjected to exploitative, 
abusive involuntary experimentation at a rate far higher than other 
ethnic groups.  Thus, although the heightened African American 
wariness of medical research and institutions reflects a situational 
hyper-vigilance, it is neither a baseless fear of harm nor a fear of 
imaginary harms.  A “paranoid” label is often affixed to blacks who are 
wary of participating in medical research.  However, not only is paranoid 
a misnomer but it is also symbolic of a dangerous misunderstanding. 
That is why I refer to African American fears of medical professionals and 
institutions as iatrophobia, coined from the Greek words iatro (“healer”) 
and phobia (“fear”).   
HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 21 
(2006). 
40. “An important theme of human experimentation before World War
II is that many of the subjects were from vulnerable populations: Children, 
mentally ill people, poor people, prisoners, minorities, and desperately ill 
people were often harmed or exploited in research . . . . After World War II, 
vulnerable subjects continued to suffer harm or exploitation in research.” 
ADIL SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 245, 265 
(2d ed. 2009) (hereinafter “RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT”).  RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT 
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examples are well known (i.e. Nazi experiments on prisoners in 
concentration camps), what may be less well known is the consistency with 
which certain groups are used as test subjects.  Prisoners,41 soldiers,42 the 
mentally ill,43 children,44 poor people,45 and people of color46 have all been 
describes many of the worst abuses of human test subjects in Chapter 13 
“Protecting Vulnerable Human Subjects in Research,” pages 265 – 288. 
41. RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, supra note 40, at 244 (“[i]n Oregon State
Prison from 1963 to 1971, researchers X-rayed the testicles of 67 male 
prisoners, who were mostly African Americans, to study the effects of 
radiation on sperm function”); id. at 266 (“[p]rior to 1973, pharmaceutical 
companies conducted about 70% of their phase I clinical trials on 
prisoners”) (internal citations omitted); see also Valerie H. Bonham & 
Jonathan D. Moreno, Research With Captive Populations: Prisoners, Students, and 
Soldiers OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 461 (Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel et al. eds., 2008). 
42. RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, supra note 40, at 244 (“[f]rom the 1940s to
the 1960s, researchers injected encapsulated radium into the nostrils of 
more than 1,500 military personnel; many developed nosebleeds and severe 
headaches after exposure”); id. at 266 (“[t]housands of military personnel 
were used in LSD experiments in the 1950s”) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Valerie H. Bonham & Jonathan D. Moreno, Research With Captive 
Populations: Prisoners, Students, and Soldiers OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH ETHICS 461 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2008). 
43. The Willowbrook hepatitis experiments were conducted from 1956
to 1980 on mentally retarded children living in the Willowbrook State School 
in Staten Island, New York.  RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, supra note 40, at 265 – 
266; see also Alan R. Fleischman & Lauren K. Collogan, Research with Children, 
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 437, 438 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel 
et al. eds., 2008) (otherwise healthy children were infected with hepatitis in 
order to study the effects of a possible antibody and the possibility of 
inducing immunity against the disease); see also Walter M. Robinson & 
Brandon T. Unruh, The Hepatitis Experiments at the Willowbrook State School, 
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 80, 84 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et 
al. eds., 2008).  Robinson and Unruh argue that the Willowbrook 
experiments, when seen in their historical and social context, are not the 
ethical violations that history has claimed, but rather that the scientists 
involved “did what they could to improve the chances that institutions were 
safer for their child residents.”  Id. at 80.  
44. Fleischman and Collogan describe scientific research in the United
States in the early 1900s: “the subjects in these studies were often poor or 
abandoned children who were provided to researchers by doctors working in 
orphanages and asylums.” Fleischman & Collogan, supra note 43, at 437, 447. 
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victims of human experimentation. The latter two categories may suffer from 
this exploitation disproportionately because they face double and triple 
jeopardy when they fall into multiple categories. 
1. CHEERS is Cancelled
CHEERS was abruptly cancelled on April 8th, 2005.47  The study had 
recruited half its test subjects, and a pilot study had taken wipe samples for 
organic compounds on household surfaces.48  As far as it is known, that is as 
far as it got.  One of the most instructive aspects of CHEERS is why it was 
cancelled.  Prior to its cancellation CHEERS was the subject of internal 
dissent in the EPA, external criticism by environmental and public health 
organizations, and faint though dogged critical press coverage. But it 
appears that none of those were enough to stop it - CHEERS was cancelled 
primarily because of the well-timed ultimatum of a U.S. Senator.   
The dissent within the EPA became known through internal emails 
obtained by the press.49  Troy Pierce, an EPA scientist in Atlanta at the time, 
said that CHEERS sounds like it “goes against everything we recommend at 
EPA concerning use of [pesticides] related to children.”50  He continued by 
stating that, “[p]aying families in Florida to have their homes routinely 
treated with pesticides is very sad when we at EPA know that [pesticide 
management] should always be used to protect children.”51  Suzanne 
Wuerthele, the EPA’s regional toxicologist in Denver at the time, wrote to 
her colleagues and proclaimed that after reviewing the project’s design she 
Fleischman and Collogan also describe Nazi experiments on child prisoners 
in concentration camps.  Id. at 447.  
45. Carol Levine, Research Involving Economically Disadvantaged Participants,
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 431 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. 
eds., 2008). 
46. Lo and Garan found that “[e]gregious misconduct in clinical
research has often centered on ethnic and minority populations.”  Bernard 
Lo & Nesrin Garan, Research with Ethnic and Minority Populations OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 423 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. eds., 
2008); see Washington, supra note 39;  see also Denise Grady, White Doctors, Black 
Subjects: Abuse Disguised as Research, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, at F5.  
47. Stephen L. Johnson, This Study was Cancelled April 8, 2005, U.S. ENVT’L 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cheers (last visited July 4, 2010). 
48. NAT’L EXPOSURE RESEARCH LAB., U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, A
LITERATURE REVIEW OF WIPE SAMPLING METHODS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
AND TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 10 (Jan. 2007).  
49. Eilperin, supra note 27.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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feared poor families would not understand the dangers associated with 
pesticide exposure and that “EPA researchers will not tell participants that 
using pesticides always entails some risk, and not using pesticides will 
reduce that risk to zero.”52  Wuerthele wrote, “[i]t is important that EPA 
behaves ethically, consistently, and in a way that engenders public health. 
Unless these issues are resolved, it is likely that all three goals will be 
compromised and the agency’s reputation will suffer.”53  
 External criticism came from a collection of environmental and 
public health groups, most notably Organic Consumers.54  In addition, 
several journalists frequently cited in this piece followed CHEERS closely.55  
They and their editors deserve praise for tenacious coverage.56 But the story 
never became a national story, nor did public knowledge of CHEERS ever 
reach a critical mass.57  
On April 7, 2005 California U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer called a press 
conference with Florida U.S. Senator Bill Nelson.58  Senator Boxer 
denounced CHEERS and declared her intent to stall the appointment of 
Stephen L. Johnson as the EPA Administrator until CHEERS was cancelled.59  
Within seventy-two hours of the press conference, Stephen Johnson 
announced that he was canceling CHEERS.60  A spokesman for the EPA 
acknowledged that Johnson canceled CHEERS in part because of the threat 
to his confirmation.61  In regards to Boxer’s press conference that was quickly 
followed by Johnson’s cancellation of CHEERS, the EPA spokesman 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. ORGANIC CONSUMERS (quoting EPA Study Proposal), supra note 15.
55. The reporters include Juliet Eilperin and Catherine Komp, and their
editors at the Washington Post, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the (no 
longer published) New Standard. 
56. Id.
57. This statement is based on anecdotal evidence.  Former 
classmates, EPA interns, and academics in the environmental field did not 
know about CHEERS until discussing it with the author.  The phenomenon 
continues to the present day with friends, family, and peers.  In fact, most 
people the author has discussed this piece with in the past six years are 
shocked to learn that pesticides are tested on human subjects. 
58. Boxer, supra note 17; see also Boxer, Nelson To “Hold” Stephens
Nomination Until EPA Cancels Pesticide Program, WHITE HOUSE BULL., Apr. 7, 2005; 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 1;  Janofsky, supra note 1. 
59. Boxer, supra note 17.
60. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.
61. Id.
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quipped, ‘‘[t]hey are pretty juxtaposed in time, aren’t they?’’ and then said 
“[t]here is clearly a connection.”62 
Six years later, many ambiguities remain about CHEERS.  The EPA and 
the ACC have little substantive information about the study on their 
websites.  Five months after CHEERS was cancelled the EPA CHEERS web 
page turned an accusatory eye towards critics of CHEERS.63  Under the title, 
“This study was cancelled April 8, 2005,” the EPA Administrator wrote: 
Last fall, in light of questions about the study design, I directed 
that all work on the study stop immediately and requested an 
independent review. Since that time, many misrepresentations 
about the study have been made. EPA senior scientists have 
briefed me on the impact these misrepresentations have had on 
the ability to proceed with the study.  I have concluded that the 
study cannot go forward, regardless of the outcome of the 
independent review. EPA must conduct quality, credible research 
in an atmosphere absent of gross misrepresentation and 
controversy.64 
The website has - to the best of the author’s knowledge - had the same 
message posted on this webpage ever since.65  Additionally, the author 
believes that in April 2005 the ACC website had two press releases regarding 
CHEERS, but they are no longer available on the ACC’s website using the 
site’s search function.66   
62. Id.
63. Johnson, supra note 47.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In 2005 the author wrote about these two press releases:
The first press release announced the beginning of CHEERS. It was on EPA 
stationery, it began and ended with names and numbers for contacts at the 
EPA and the ACC, and it concluded with short descriptions of the missions 
of the EPA and the ACC.  BARBARA LEITERMAN, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 
EPA PARTNERS WITH AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL TO STUDY YOUNG CHILDREN’S
EXPOSURES TO HOUSEHOLD CHEMICALS (2004).  The press release begins, “[t]he 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the American Chemistry Council 
(ACC) announced today a Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement (CRADA) to conduct a landmark study to learn more about how 
young children come into contact with household pesticides and other 
chemicals in their homes.”  The second press release on the ACC website 
was from the day CHEERS was cancelled.  It was on ACC stationery. BARBARA 
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In part because the ACC and the EPA have become virtually silent on 
the subject of CHEERS, the substantive information readily available to the 
public is largely from its critics.  Therefore, many questions cannot be 
answered.  For example, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune wrote that CHEERS was 
“seriously flawed” in part because it “astonishingly – contained no provision 
for intervening if the children showed signs of health damage.”67  The New 
York Times reported that a recruiting flier for CHEERS offered the financial 
and material benefits previously listed ($960.00, the video camera, and 
CHEERS clothing) “to parents whose infants or babies were exposed to 
pesticides if the parents completed the two – year study.”68  This implies that 
if parents decided to change or discontinue their use of pesticides (perhaps 
wondering why the EPA was studying their child’s development in reference 
to pesticides at all), they might not get the material rewards promised at the 
end of the two years.69  As far as is known, neither the EPA nor the ACC 
directly addressed these assertions, thus these as well as many other 
questions about CHEERS remain unanswered.   
2. CHEERS Exemplifies Ethical Quandaries in the Field
What type of human experiment did CHEERS propose?  Was the 
CHEERS proposal an observational study, as previously described, or is the 
fact that CHEERS proposed taking blood and urine samples from the test 
subject children, as well as attaching activity sensors to them, enough to 
take it out of the realm of observational studies?   
If CHEERS was not an observational study, it also was not an 
intentional dosage test.70  CHEERS manages to skirt these distinctions, as 
LEITERMAN, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, CHEMICAL MAKERS BACK EPA
DIRECTION ON EXPOSURE RESEARCH (2005). 
67. Test of Ethics: Pesticide-study Proposal Lacks Adequate Safeguards,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 5, 2005, at A10. 
68. Id. (emphasis added); see also Eilperin, supra note 27.
69. A less credible report regarding CHEERS came from The Baltimore
Sun, which reported that according to internal EPA critics of the program, it 
had planned to give teething rings and cheese slices to test subject infants 
because “researchers knew that infants dropped them and then placed them 
in their mouths.”  Andrew Schneider, New Rules For Testing On Humans 
Denounced; Senior EPA Staff Criticize Agency Proposal As Flawed, BALTIMORE SUN, 
July 7, 2005, at A1.  Supposedly this method would more effectively 
introduce pesticides or pesticide residue on the floor into the bodies of the 
test subject children through the teething rings and food. 
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 26.1102(i), supra note 22 (An intentional dose test is
where a test subject is given a specific dosage of a substance through 
ingestion, injection, or inhalation). 
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well as ably demonstrating several of the ethical questions implicit in 
observational tests of pesticides on people.   
For example, when scientists “passively observe” human conduct in 
order to determine the health risks of such conduct, what are the scientists’ 
moral obligations when if the scientist told the test subject the suspected 
risks of that conduct, the subject might choose to discontinue the conduct 
altogether?71  Suzanne Wuerthele, the EPA scientist previously cited, 
objected to CHEERS on exactly this basis when she expressed her concern 
that the test subjects might not know about the risks of pesticide use 
because EPA researchers would not inform participants about the risk, and 
that they could “reduce that risk to zero” by not using pesticides.72  
Another ethical question implicit in observational tests of pesticides 
on people involves the Hawthorne Effect.73  The Hawthorne Effect shows that 
if human test subjects are aware that they are being studied, that awareness 
alone affects their conduct, possibly making it abnormal and invalidating 
the scientific results.74  Paying people with money or goods to “do what they 
normally do” may have this effect.  Therefore, paying people to take part in a 
pesticide study may influence them to expose their bodies (or the bodies of 
their children or others in their care) to pesticides, even though they will not 
directly benefit from the pesticide exposure and the exposure may in fact 
cause negative health consequences.  The New Yorker’s article on “guinea 
pigging” describes a small distinct group of people who appear to make their 
living as human test subjects in medical trials.75  At least one test subject 
profiled in the story took intentional doses of experimental drugs knowing 
that he was “not going to get the benefit of the health care  [that was] 
developed by [the] research . . . because [he was] not in the economic class 
to get health insurance.”76  In another case first reported by the Wall Street 
Journal and described in the New Yorker:  
[T]he Eli Lilly company was using homeless alcoholics from a
local shelter to test experimental drugs at budget rates at its
testing site in Indianapolis . . . .  The Lilly clinic, the Journal 
reported, had developed such a reputation for admitting the 
71. Eilperin, supra note 27.
72. Id.
73. RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, supra note 40, at 245.  With thanks to Anne
Fried who first explained the Hawthorne Effect to the author.  
74. Id., supra note 40, at 245.
75. Carl Elliot, Guinea-Pigging, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 2008.
76. Id.
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down-and-out that subjects traveled to Indianapolis from all over 
the country to participate in studies.77 
Extrapolating from the conduct of human test subjects of medical 
trials to human test subjects of pesticide trials, it is feasible that parents or 
guardians of child test subjects could change their conduct in order to 
receive the financial and material benefits of participating in CHEERS.  For 
example, the parents or guardians of test subjects might change the amount 
or type of pesticide(s) they use in order to enroll their children in the study, 
or they might maintain a level of use or loyalty to a particular pesticide in 
order to receive compensation from the study.  In short, the pesticide 
exposure of the child test subjects could have been affected by CHEERS 
recruiting their parents or guardians. 
Lastly, like many pesticide tests on people profiled in this article, 
CHEERS may have threatened to violate ethical standards because it was 
simply bad science.  In 1998 the EPA appointed a joint subcommittee of the 
Science Advisory Board and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) Scientific Advisory Panel (“SAB/SAP”) to advise it 
on the ethics of using data from the pesticide tests on people being 
presented for its consideration.78  SAB/SAP was so internally divided that its 
final report was emphatically rejected by two committee members.79  Those 
committee members wrote a scalding Minority Report that was included as 
an Appendix to the final Majority Report.80 
Despite the substantive disagreements between the SAB/SAP Majority 
and Minority Reports,81 and the Minority Report’s troubling accusations of 
misrepresentation and distortion in the Majority Report,82 it appears that all 
parties agreed that “[b]ad science is always unethical; research protocols 
that are fundamentally flawed, such as those with sample sizes inadequate 
77. Id.
78. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, How Many Times Do I Have to Tell You?!:
EPA’s Ongoing Struggle with Data from Third Party Pesticide Toxicity Studies Using 
Human Subjects, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 205, 222 (2004). 
79. COMMENTS ON THE USE OF DATA FROM THE TESTING OF HUMAN SUBJECTS:
A REPORT BY THE SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD AND THE FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY
PANEL, EPA-SAB-EC-oo-017, A-1 (Sept. 2000) (hereinafter “SAB/SAP Report”); 
available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/1999/november/ec00 
17.pdf.
80. Id. at C-1.
81. Id.
82. Id. at C-1, C-2.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013 
210 
to support reasonable inferences about the matter in question, are 
unjustifiable.”83   
CHEERS was an example of “bad science” for two reasons.  First, its 
proposed sample size was inadequate to support reasonable inferences 
about the matter in question.  CHEERS proposed examining the effects of 
certain pesticides by studying thirty test subjects over two years.84  In order 
for the results of CHEERS to be applicable to the general population, it 
would need a far larger number of test subjects.  The SAB/SAP Minority 
Report stated:  
[S]trong documentation [was found] that the human studies
done by the pesticide manufacturers were scientifically invalid.
They showed that to find a small effect, at least 2500 subjects in
each group were necessary.  They also showed that the sample
sizes used by the [pesticide] manufacturers, (7 to 50 subjects) to
report no effect [from the pesticide exposure] had a 3% to 4%
chance to find an effect.85
Second, CHEERS proposed to study chemicals that have long-term 
effects over a short term.  SAB/SAP’s Majority Report described this as a 
common limitation of pesticide experiments on people:  
[A]lthough volunteer experiments typically involve brief
exposure, many real world questions about safety involve chronic
exposures.  This is particularly relevant with pesticide exposures.
In one case from the insecticide literature, investigators studying
a sample of farmers exposed while treating sheep with
organophosphates . . . reported that the chronic effects of
exposure, primarily neurobehavioral in character, are not
predicted by sensitivity to any acute warning signs.86
The SAB/SAP Majority Report asserted that this scientific weakness 
could be “addressed by careful experimental design,”87 but one SAB/SAP 
83. Id. at 1.
84. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; Janofsky, supra note 1; Eilperin, supra
note 7, at A23. 
85. Id. at C-2.  The paragraph quoted ends with: “[t]his was initially
placed in the body of the [SAB/SAP Majority Report] draft, then removed 
and buried in the appendix, despite the repeated protest of members of the 
committee.”  Id. 
86. SAB/SAP Report, supra note 79, at 12 – 13.
87. Id. at 13.
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committee member “disagreed, noting that chronic effects, such as the 
neurobehavioral changes seen for the [organophosphates] would be very 
difficult, possibly impossible, to detect in acute studies regardless of the 
design.”88 
In her testimony to the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, Senator Barbara Boxer described some of the potential long-
term health effects of pesticide exposure: 
Pesticides can cause cancer and adversely affect a child’s 
neurological, reproductive, respiratory, immune, and endocrine 
systems, even at low levels.  It is also my understanding that 
EPA’s new cancer risk assessment guidelines for early life 
exposure finds that children under two may have a tenfold 
increase in risk from cancer causing substances.89 
It is important to remember that (other than the promise of the 
exchange of money between the EPA and the ACC, taking wipe samples from 
household surfaces, and recruiting half its test subjects)90 the pesticide tests 
on human subjects proposed by CHEERS did not actually begin.  However, 
it is possible that that is only because, as previously described, fortuitous 
timing enabled Senator Boxer to bring CHEERS to the level of presidential 
politics. 
88. Id.  ORGANIC CONSUMERS puts this scientific weakness into 
layperson’s terms: 
The trick here is that these products are known to have negative long-
term health effects. This is a short two-year study. In other words, the 
results of the study are already known . . . there will be little to no 
obvious short-term negative effects on these children at the end of the 
two-year period. The seemingly positive results of the study will allow 
the ACC to announce positive ‘EPA study results’ to the public, which 
will allow the ACC to more effectively lobby Congress to weaken 
regulations on these products.   
ORGANIC CONSUMERS, EPA & CHEMICAL INDUSTRY TO STUDY EFFECTS OF KNOWN 
TOXIC CHEMICALS ON CHILDREN: STUDY LAUNCH DATE SUSPENDED UNTIL SUMMER
2005, OFFERS PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD, http://www.organicconsumers.org/epa-
alert.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2011). 
89. Videotape: Senator Barbara Boxer, Testimony to the U.S. Senate
Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. (Apr. 6, 2005) (on file with author). 
90. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at A15; Janofsky, supra note 1, at A19;
Eilperin, supra note 7, at A23; ORGANIC CONSUMERS, supra note 15, at A23; 
NAT’L EXPOSURE RESEARCH LAB., supra note 48, at 10. 
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B. Pesticide Tests on People Between 1967 and 2004
In 2005 the United States Congress received a report it had 
commissioned called Human Pesticide Experiments (the “Congressional 
Report”).91  The Congressional Report describes twenty-two tests of 
pesticides on humans between 1967 and 2004.92 
Of the pesticide tests on people described in the Report, six were 
conducted in the U.S., sixteen in foreign nations.93  The EPA was considering 
every test described in the Congressional Report in order to evaluate the 
safety of the pesticide tested.94   
This is a crucial point, which runs through this paper: when this article 
refers to pesticide tests on people, it is usually only referring to those tests 
whose results were submitted, or were intended to be submitted, to US 
regulators.  The submission of such tests to the EPA for its consideration 
automatically subjects them to the EPA’s regulations, thereby bringing them 
under U.S. legal scrutiny.  Because the US is one of the largest users, if not 
the largest user of chemical pesticides in the world,95 this lariat is wide 
enough to catch a meaningful percentage of the total number of pesticide 
tests on people.   
Returning to the Congressional Report of pesticide tests on human 
subjects, perhaps the most significant common denominator of the twenty-
two human pesticide experiments it described was their purpose:  
[T]he strongest case for conducting human pesticide experiments
can be made when the pesticide being tested offers the promise
of significant health or environmental benefits compared to
products already on the market.  None of the 22 experiments
being considered by EPA appear to meet this standard.  To the
contrary, the vast majority of the experiments were conducted for
precisely the opposite reason: to justify keeping older and more
dangerous pesticides on the market.96
91. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, AND ENVTL. STAFF OF S. BOXER,
81ST CONG., HUMAN PESTICIDE EXPERIMENTS (2005) (hereinafter “CONGRESSIONAL
REPORT”). 
92. Id. at 9, 33 – 34 app. A.a.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id. at intro, i.  According to the CONGRESSIONAL REPORT every test
had violations of ethical standards. 
95. Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food
Safety in the Era of Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BKLYN L. REV. 823, 
827 (2000/2001). 
96. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 10.
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One of the earliest tests was a 1969 study of dichlorvos.  The reader is 
asked to remember that “interpretations and applications of basic ethical 
principles as they are expressed in . . . rules on conduct do evolve over 
time,”97 and many of these rules have become more strict.98  Therefore, 
holding scientists from an earlier era to modern research ethics may be 
unfair.  However, certain principles of scientific ethics are longstanding; “not 
treating others as mere means” to the scientist’s end-goal and accurately 
reporting results even when they are unfavorable are among those 
longstanding principles.99  
With these principles in mind: 
EPA is considering [] a 1969 study involving the pesticide 
dichlorvos, an organophosphate pesticide manufactured by 
American Vanguard (AMVAC).  In this experiment, 16 families in 
Tucson, Arizona, were exposed in their homes to resin strips 
containing the pesticide dichlorvos for a six-month period. 
Among the human subjects were 35 children (ranging in age from 
2 to 19).  The results of the experiment showed that 
cholinesterase levels dropped by up to 50% in test subjects, but 
the study concluded that the decrease “does not appear to be 
related to any adverse clinical responses.  There are many factors 
other than dichlorvos which may produce lowering.”100  
In the same study, a seventeen year-old girl complained of headaches. 
The researchers removed the resin strip from the girl’s bedroom and her 
headaches stopped.  Yet the researchers stated that, “[q]uestioning of the 
parent revealed the likelihood that the headaches were produced by other 
pressures.”101  
Thirty-three years after the completion of this study, researchers 
sponsored by the manufacturer of dichlorvos reanalyzed the 1969 data to 
see if the old data could help establish a level at which chronic inhalation 
97. Rep. Advisory Comm. on Hum. Radiation Experiments, Res. Ethics
and Med. Prof., reprinted in BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
LAW 618 – 619 (Arthur B. La France ed., Mathew Bender & Co., Inc., 1999). 
This report on U.S. government Cold War radiation experiments was written 
decades after the experiments were conducted. 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 883.
100. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 31.
101. Id.
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exposure had no effect on humans.  The researchers found that much of the 
study’s scientific data was so variable that it had to be discarded.102  
The Congressional Report describes a 1992 study in which thirty-six 
human subjects were given a pill with the pesticide aldicarb in it “with 
orange juice at breakfast.”103 Aldicarb is a “suspected endocrine, reproductive 
and neurotoxicant.”104  After swallowing the aldicarb pill, the test subjects 
were monitored for drops in cholinesterase in their nerve cells.105  The test 
subjects were given doses already known to be dangerous: “in this 
experiment, human subjects were given doses sufficient to cause a 70% drop 
in cholinesterase levels, causing the subject to experience ‘profuse whole 
body sweating.’”106  Before the study began the EPA had already found that a 
20% drop in cholinesterase in human nerve cells could reveal toxicity107 and 
in 1998 industry representatives had described a 50% drop in cholinesterase 
as being “associated with adverse effects requiring treatment” with an 
antidote.108  
The Congressional Report depicts a 2004 study of the pesticide 
chloropicrin.109  Chloropicrin is a suspected neurotoxicant that may damage 
DNA.110 In the study, 127 young people, many “college students and 
minorities”111 were paid $15 an hour to allow chloropicrin vapor to be “shot 
directly into their nostrils and eyes” or to go into a chamber filled with 
chloropicrin vapor “for up to one hour on four consecutive days.”112  The 
permissible exposure limit under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration is 100 parts per billion, and the vapor chamber repeatedly 
entered by the test subjects was filled with up to 1200 parts per billion of 
chloropicrin.113   
An article in Environmental Health Perspectives described a study evaluated 
by the EPA in 2001, in which a contractor for Dow Chemical paid volunteers 
in Lincoln, Nebraska up to $460 to swallow chlorpyrifos in concentrations up 
102. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 25.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id.  It was banned in the European Union in 2003.  Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 13 – 14.
109. Id. at 14 – 16.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 15 – 16.
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to 300 times higher than the EPA’s “safe” level at the time.114  One of the test 
subjects, a woman who received the highest dose “reported numbness in her 
upper arms, which company officials ruled ‘possibly’ related to the 
pesticide.”115 
That same year, a contractor for the pesticide manufacturer Bayer 
submitted results of a test on humans of a pesticide called azinphos methyl 
to the EPA.116  Azynphos methyl is a pesticide that was derived from nerve 
gases used in World War II.117  The azinphos methyl study was conducted on 
114. Oleskey et al., Pesticide Testing in Humans: Ethics and Public Policy, 112
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., 914, 916 (2004). 
115. Id.
116. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, EPA REVERSES BAN ON
TESTING PESTICIDES ON HUMAN SUBJECTS, Nov. 28, 2001 (hereinafter “NRDC 
REPORT”), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressReleases/011128a.asp.  
There are two azinphos methyl tests the NRDC report could be referring to. 
Both are described in the CONGRESSIONAL REPORT.  One has marked 
similarities to the test described the NRDC REPORT, therefore, that is the 
azinphos methyl test that is described in detail in this article.   
Of the two azinphos methyl human tests in the CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, the 
first was in 1998, and involved thirty-five subjects being given doses of 
azinphos methyl twice as high as those at which animals were predicted to 
experience adverse effects.  CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 36 app. 
B. “Every adverse effect reported by the human test subjects was dismissed
as unrelated to the azinphos methyl and “attributed to ‘viral illness’ or ‘ward
conditions’ or left unexplained.”  Id.
The second azinphos methyl study described in the CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 
took place in 1999.  Id. at 35 – 36 app. B.  It involved eight subjects receiving 
the same dose of azinphos methyl each day for 28 days, and being 
compensated $2,400.  These latter two details make the author believe that 
this 1999 study is the same azinphos methyl test described in the NRDC
REPORT.  Twenty-eight days can be the month’s duration described by the 
NRDC, and the discrepancy between $2,400 and the author’s $2,160 can be 
explained by mathematical quibbles over exchange rates and averages.  For 
example, which average exchange rate applies?  The rate of 1999 when the 
payment was made or of 2005 when the CONGRESSIONAL REPORT was written? 
These quibbles are particularly insignificant when it is remembered that the 
Congressional Report’s review of the first azinphos methyl human test, 
conducted in 1998, mentioned neither compensation nor a period of days.   
It is for these reasons that the author concludes that the 1999 azinphos 
methyl study described in the Congressional Report is the same as that 
described in the NRDC report, and has written about that test accordingly.   
117. NRDC REPORT, supra note 116.
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eight adult male volunteers in Scotland.118  The test subjects were 
hospitalized for a month and given the same dose of azinphos methyl each 
of the twenty-eight days of the study.119  They gave blood and urine samples 
and were paid for their participation.120  Test subjects who did not complete 
the twenty-eight day study risked not receiving monetary compensation 
unless the supervising doctor approved.121  Every human test subject 
reported “adverse events” which were “universally dismissed as unrelated to 
the dosing.”122   
There have been six experiments between 1967 and 2004 that, in the 
words of the Congressional Report, “placed their human subjects at risk in 
order to attempt to identify a ‘no observed effects level’ (NOEL) in humans. 
These experiments exposed the test subjects to a pesticide in an attempt to 
identify the lowest exposure levels that would cause an effect.”123   
One of these tests was a 1996 experiment involving methyl 
isothiocyanate: 
[The study] tested the NOEL of methyl isothiocyanate (MITC) . . . 
manufactured by several companies who sponsored [the] study 
as a consortium.  MITC is similar in terms of structure and 
toxicity to methyl isocyanate, the chemical that killed thousands 
in Bhopal, India.  
In this experiment, researchers modified laboratory goggles in 
order to allow MITC to be piped inside the goggles, exposing test 
subjects’ eyes to the fumigant for up to 8 hours . . . . The goal of 
the experiment was to determine the no observable effect levels 
for human eye irritation.  At the higher levels of exposure, some 
subjects reported that the level of irritation in their eyes became 
so extreme that it approached or was at the “maximum” level, 
which would require the experiment to be terminated.124  
In the absence of a congressional report on the issue since 2005, it is 
difficult to know how many pesticide tests on people were conducted from 
2005 to 2012.  However, the EPA’s 2010 online summary of its protections 
for subjects of human studies research stated, “[h]istorically, EPA has 
118. Id.
119. Id.; see CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 35 – 36 app. B.
120. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 116, at n. 110.
121. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 21.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Id. at 11.
124. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 12.
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received approximately 33 intentional dosing studies of ALL [sic.] types 
annually.”125  Presumably these were all observational pesticide tests on 
people, because the EPA’s proposed revised Human Studies Rule126 asserts 
that the EPA has not received a single intentional dosage human testing 
study for review since 2006.127   
It is possible that the 2006 Human Testing Rule and the Human 
Studies Review Board128 have reined in the most flagrant ethical violations 
found in intentional dosage pesticide tests on people.  What, then, do 
ethical tests of pesticides on people look like?  Two possible examples 
follow. 
III. Is it Possible to Ethically Test Pesticides on People?
A. The Agricultural Health Study
The Agricultural Health Study is a largely observational study of over 
89,000 farmers, commercial pesticide applicators and the adult members of 
their families in Iowa and North Carolina.129  The National Institutes of 
Health and the EPA began studying the pesticide exposures and health of 
these farmers and their life partners in 1993,130 specifically looking at why 
farmers appear to have higher rates of certain cancers than the general 
population, and why of all the potential contributing factors, there are 
strong links between pesticide exposure and cancer malignancies.131  
The Agricultural Health Study, like CHEERS, observes and measures 
the pesticide exposure of people who are already exposed and theoretically 
will not change their exposure in response to the study.  However, there are 
125. EPA, Expanded Protections for Subjects in Human Studies Research, April
1, 2010, http://web.archive.org/web/20100401013331/http://www.epa.gov/oppf 
ead1/guidance/human-test.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
126. Revisions to EPA’s Rule on Protections for Subjects in Human Research
Involving Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 22 (Feb. 2, 2011).  These revisions are outside 
the scope of this particular article. 
127. Id.
128. The 2006 Human Testing Rule and the Human Studies Review
Board are outside the scope of this particular article.  
129. Michael C.R. Alavanja et al., The Agricultural Health Study, 104
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 4, 362, April 1996 “Commentary”; see WELCOME TO THE
AGRICULTURAL HEALTH STUDY, available at http://aghealth.nci.nih.gov/ (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2011). 
130. Alavanja, supra note 129; see also WELCOME TO THE AGRICULTURAL 
HEALTH STUDY, supra note 129.  
131. Alavanja, supra note 129.
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many other differences between the two studies that make the Agricultural 
Health Study more ethical than CHEERS.  The Agricultural Health Study’s 
test subjects are adults132 and are not paid in either money or goods.133  The 
Study is funded and conducted by two federal agencies that have no known 
conflicts of interest.134  At over 89,000 test subjects,135 the sample size is large 
enough to achieve adequate statistical power to make its findings 
scientifically valid.  Thus, the usual ethical concerns in regards to potential 
coercion of test subjects, conflicts of interest, and scientific integrity appear 
to be allayed.   
The ethical questions that remain are: 
(1) Was the information on the English-only Agricultural Health Study
website that “agricultural workers . . . may experience higher rates of 
leukemia, myeloma, non-Hogkin’s lymphoma, and [various] cancers”136 given 
directly to the test subjects?   
(2) If this information is on only one of the Agricultural Health Study’s
web pages, do all the test subjects (especially agricultural day laborers and 
their partners) have meaningful access to it if they are not English literate 
and/or do not have internet access?  
(3) Were the test subjects (especially agricultural day laborers and
their partners) told why they were chosen as subjects in a language that they 
could understand?   
(4) Were the test subjects informed that they could reduce their health
risk by discontinuing occupational or familial exposure to the pesticides 
being studied? 
B. The Endosulfan Study
In Kerala India, two villages presented an ideal opportunity to research 
the effect(s), if any, of the pesticide endosulfan.137  One of the two villages 
was in a valley below cashew plantations that had been sprayed with 
endosulfan for twenty years. 138  The other village was free of endosulfan 
exposure.139  There already was “experimental evidence of adverse effects of 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 363.
134. Id.
135. WELCOME TO THE AGRICULTURAL HEALTH STUDY, supra note 129.
136. Id.
137. H. Saiyed et al., Effect of Endosulfan on Male Reproductive Development,
111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 16, 1958-1962 (2003). 
138. Id. at 1958-59.
139. Id.
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endosulfan on the male reproductive system”140 but there was no human 
data on those effects when the study was undertaken.141  Researchers from 
the Indian Council of Medical Research, the Regional Occupational Health 
Research Center and an Indian medical college studied the reproductive 
development of 117 male schoolchildren in the first village, along with 
ninety in the second village, by taking blood samples and performing 
physical examinations.142  The physical examinations were performed by 
“pediatricians observing necessary privacy required for this delicate 
examination.”143  Parents were asked to “accompany their children at the 
time of examination,”144 which only occurred after they acquired (what 
appears to be) informed consent from parents.   
The study found low testosterone levels and congenital abnormalities 
among the boys (aged ten to nineteen) who had been exposed to 
endosulfan.145  The scientists urged further study with a larger sample size 
over a longer time period.146  
Although the only source of information found on this study is an 
article written by the researchers themselves, the study as represented in the 
article bears the signs of ethical practice.  The researchers showed 
knowledge of the preexisting studies in the field;147 they designed the study 
to answer a scientific question not yet solved;148 and they attempted to do so 
with as large a sample as possible149 given that only 43% of the study 
subjects agreed to undergo the physical examination necessary to establish 
their sexual maturity.150  The researchers appeared to understand the various 
vectors of exposure to endosulfan,151 and attempted to minimize the 
socioeconomic and other differences between the study group and the 
control group.152  There does not appear to be a danger that test subjects’ 
families would alter their pesticide exposure in response to the study or 
140. Id. at 1958.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1959.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1958.
146. Id. at 1962.
147. Id. at 1958 (the article begins with an analysis of prior research on
the subject). 
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1959.
151. Id. at 1958.
152. Id.
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compensation from the study.  There does not appear to be a conflict of 
interest between the researchers and pesticide manufacturers or other 
interested parties.   
The ethical question that remains is: 
(1) Were the consent forms used in this study ethical? Acquiring the
informed consent of parents or guardians of children is not equivalent to the 
informed consent of the test subject children themselves.  And yet children 
cannot give informed consent because they are either too young to 
understand or are too subject to the influence of their parents or 
guardians.153  Therefore is it even possible to acquire informed consent for 
non-therapeutic research conducted on children?  
IV. The Laws and Regulations that Govern Pesticides
A. FIFRA, FFDCA, and FQPA
In order for a pesticide to be manufactured, imported, or sold in the 
U.S. it needs to be registered by the EPA.154  The EPA will only register those 
pesticides it considers “safe,” as defined by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”), and the Food Quality Protection Act (“FQPA”).155  
In determining what is considered “safe,” FIFRA demands that the 
pesticide perform its intended function without causing any “unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment,”156 defined as “any unreasonable risk to 
man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and 
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.”157  The FFDCA 
allows the sale of food only if its pesticide residue is less than the “safe” 
residue tolerance determined by the EPA.158  Lastly, FQPA sets a 
153. The question of whether parents can provide informed consent on
behalf of their children for non-therapeutic treatment and/or testing is 
beyond the scope of this article.  It is a highly complex and controversial 
subject, worthy of a literature review and a deeper exploration than is 
possible in these pages.  
154. Marshall Lee Miller, Pesticides, ENVTL. LAW HANDBOOK, § 3.0 at 693
(9th ed., 2007). 
155. Br. for Pet. at 8, NRDC v. EPA, No. 06-0820 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2006),
available at http://www.beyondpesticides.org/documents/OpeningBr%2010%20 
4%2006%20FINAL.pdf.  
156. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
157. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb); see also Br. for Pet., supra note 155, at 8; Miller,
supra note 154, at 694. 
158. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 341(a)(2)(B), 346(a)(1) & (2), 346a(b)(2)(A)(i);
see also Br. for Pet., supra note 155, at 8. 
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precautionary standard159 to protect children from pesticide residues in 
food.160  It requires EPA address the special risks to infants and children 
when setting pesticide tolerances, by demanding EPA apply an extra ten-
fold safety factor for children (bringing the animal:human safety factor to 
1000:1), with limited exceptions.161  
The FQPA has had an interesting effect on the pesticide industry. 
In 1999 the EPA announced its first FQPA review of two pesticides, azinphos 
methyl and methyl parathion.162  Soon after the review was announced - but 
before the review began - two manufacturers of these pesticides agreed to 
more stringent use limitations.163  The manufacturers thereby avoided review 
of their pesticides’ effect on children, along with any EPA-mandated 
restrictions that might follow.164    
The Chemical Market Reporter wrote “[i]nterest in human testing has 
increased since enactment of the Food Quality Protection of [sic] Act of 
1996, which requires consideration of an extra tenfold safety factor to 
protect infants and children in the absence of adequate data.”165  Science 
magazine reported that the FQPA “reduced the market for some pesticides 
by 90% - and had the unintended effect of increasing the incentives for 
pesticide companies to test on humans, including children, in an effort to 
demonstrate pesticide safety.”166  In 2001, the EPA stated that it was 
159. Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common
Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 529, 89, 96 (2006). 
160. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(C)(ii)(II).  When President Clinton signed
FQPA into law on Aug. 3, 1996, he declared: “This act puts the safety of our 
children first.  It sets a standard high; if a pesticide poses a danger to our 
children, it won’t be in our food, period.” NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1251 (1996).  The policies of the Clinton 
and Bush administrations on human pesticide experiments are outside the 
scope of this paper.  They are described in CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 
91, at 2 – 7. 
161. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(C)(ii)(II).
162. EPA Begins Study of Pesticides’ Effects on Children’s Health, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 3, 1999, at A6. 
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Human Testing Considered Necessary to Establish Pesticide Exposure Levels,
8 CHEM. MARKET REP. 263, 10 (2003). 
166. Jocelyn Kaiser, Testing pesticides on humans given qualified endorsement;
Ethics, SCIENCE, Feb. 27, 2004, at 1272 (“[p]esticide makers funded human 
exposure studies in response to children protection rules in a 1996 law: It 
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“concerned about the possibility of increased human testing as a way to 
potentially avoid some of the protections that the Food Quality Protection 
Act establishes.”167 
In the ten years before the Food Quality Protection Act was passed, the 
EPA received “a handful of human tests.”168  In the three years that followed, 
the agency received [fourteen] new, unsolicited human subject studies on 
[ten] pesticides.”169 
Pesticides are now subject to nine federal laws, but this piece focuses 
on the three laws described above, and the regulations interpreting them, as 
they have the greatest bearing on the subjects addressed.170  
requires EPA to consider lowering the official safe level of pesticide 
exposure on the theory that children are especially vulnerable”). 
167. See NRDC Report, supra note 116.  According to the Los Angeles
Times, in 2005 “[r]esults of two dozen human experiments involving 
pesticides [were] being reviewed by the EPA – most of them conducted 
outside of the U.S..  Marla Cone, The Nation; EPA Criticized for Pesticide Testing 
Rules; A Proposed policy on experiments on human volunteers in inadequate and could 
lead to abuse by industry, California lawmakers charge, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at 
A12. 
168. Elizabeth Shogren, U.S. Will Use Once-Banned Human Tests; Pesticides:
EPA Says It Will Accept Industry Data Gathered By Giving Paid Subjects Chemical 
Doses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A1. 
169. Id.
170. Three of the nine laws that that govern registration and use of
pesticides in the U.S., but have no known bearing on the subject of this 
article, are the Safe Drinking Water Act  [42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i), 
(b)(4)(B)], the Comprehensive Environmental Response [42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 
9606], Compensation and Liability Act, and the Resource Conversation and 
Recovery Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 6922 – 6924]; see Br. for Pet., supra note 155.  The 
other three laws are the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.  The National Research Council 
describes the legal standard for each:  
“ ‘[T]o protect public health’ (Clean Air Act; 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) [2003]), 
‘assure protection of public health’ (Clean Water Act; 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) 
[2003]), and [to] ‘adequately assure[], to the extent feasible, on the basis 
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material 
impairment of health or functional capacity’ (Occupational Safety and 
Health Act; 29 USC § 655(b) [2003]).”   
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON TOXICITY TESTING AND ASSESSMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS, TOXICITY TESTING FOR ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL. AGENTS:
INTERIM REP. 16 (2006).  
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B. Human Health Risk Assessments
Federal agencies like the EPA interpret and apply the laws that govern 
pesticides in the U.S. by promulgating regulations that set acceptable 
pesticide exposure levels171 and corresponding safe levels of use.  These 
regulations are built on human health risk assessments.  Human health risk 
assessments are primarily established through toxicity testing on animals.172  
Although there may be a welcome shift towards non-animal chemical 
toxicity tests173 that are quick,174 cost effective175 and humane, animal testing 
is currently the mainstay of toxicity testing.176  Animal testing is used to 
establish a symptom threshold: the level of exposure to the pesticide where 
no statistically significant adverse reaction is observed.177  This threshold is 
usually called the “no observed effect level” (“NOEL”).178   
Once the NOEL is established for a pesticide, the EPA divides it by ten 
to account for the interspecies variations between non-human animals and 
humans (10:1).179  The resulting number is then divided by ten again, to 
account for variation between individual humans (because some humans 
171. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 170.
172. CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVTL. LAW HANDBOOK 738 (19th ed.
2007).  In terms of linguistics, “toxicity testing on animals” could include 
testing on humans, since humans are animals.  In fact, there is a mere 3% 
gene difference between many of “the higher apes” and us.   JANE GOODALL &
MARC BEKOFF, THE TEN TRUSTS 3 (2002).  Nonetheless animals in this piece 
will only mean “non-human animals,” as per common parlance. 
173. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA AWARDS CONTRACTS TO
U.S. COMPANIES TO SCREEN CHEMICALS FOR HUMAN HEALTH IMPACTS (Aug. 4, 
2011). 
In 2002 the Toxicology Working Group of the British Parliament’s Select 
Committee on Animals in Scientific Procedures found that “the effectiveness 
and reliability of animal tests is unproven.”  SELECT COMMITTEE ON ANIMALS IN
SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURES, REPORT, 2001-02, H.L. 150.  The Working Group 
recommended that “the reliability and relevance of all existing animal tests 
should be reviewed as a matter of urgency.”  Id.; see also NIALL SHANKS ET AL., 
ARE ANIMAL MODELS PREDICTIVE FOR HUMANS?, PHILOS., ETHICS, AND HUMANIT. IN
MED. 4:1 (2009), available at http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/2. 
174. NRDC Report, supra note 116.
175. Id.
176. BELL ET AL., supra note 172, at 738.
177. Oleskey et al., supra note 114, at 915.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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are more sensitive than others).180  As a result, the overall NOEL from the 
animal tests is divided by 100 to establish a “reference dose” for humans 
(100:1).181  In other words, if animals can be exposed to 1 milligram of a 
pesticide without showing any negative effects, then it is extrapolated that 
humans can be exposed to .01 milligram of that pesticide without showing 
any negative effects.  The safe exposure level for humans is set at that level.  
The FQPA demands that the animal:human reference dose ratio be 
divided by 100 a third time in order to protect children, who are more 
sensitive than adults to pesticides.182  This brings the animal to human 
reference dose ratio to 1000:1.183  
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. The National Pesticide Information Center addresses children’s
increased sensitivity to pesticides: 
Infants and children are more sensitive to the toxic effects of pesticides 
than adults. An infant’s brain, nervous system, and organs are still 
developing after birth. When exposed, a baby’s immature liver and 
kidneys cannot remove pesticides from the body as well as an adult’s 
liver and kidneys. Infants may also be exposed to more pesticide [sic.] 
than adults because they take more breaths per minute and have more 
skin surface relative to their body weight. Children often spend more 
time closer to the ground, touching baseboards and lawns where 
pesticides may have been applied. Children often eat and drink more 
relative to their body weight than adults, which can lead to a higher 
dose of pesticide residue per pound of body weight.  
NATIONAL PESTICIDE INFORMATION CENTER, PESTICIDES AND CHILDREN, 
http://npic.orst.edu/health/child.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).  The 
National Pesticide Information Center describes itself (in a standing 
paragraph at the bottom of every webpage on its website) as the result of “a 
cooperative agreement between Oregon State University and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency“ that “provides objective, science-based 
information about pesticides and pesticide-related topics to enable people 
to make informed decisions.”  Id.  The same paragraph ends by saying that 
“[t]he information in this publication does not in any way replace or 
supersede the restrictions, precautions, directions, or other information on 
the pesticide label or any other regulatory requirements, nor does it 
necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. EPA.”  Id.   
Note also that there is a narrow exception to the 1000:1 human reference 
dose ratio, where “reliable data show that a different factor will be safe.” 
Oleskey et al., supra note 114, at 915. 
183. Id.
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C. Incentives to Test Pesticides on People
The first division of the reference dose (10:1) is intended to make up 
for the biological differences between animals and humans.  However, if the 
pesticide is tested directly on people, that first division by ten is no longer 
necessary.184  As a result, testing pesticides on human subjects makes a 
lower safety factor possible, which “often leads to a higher permitted 
exposure level[].”185  According to the trade publication Chemical Week, 
“[i]ndustry believes human testing data could disprove some of the harmful 
risks associated with pesticides.”186  The chemical industry argues that 
human tests “provide more accurate results, allowing pesticides to be 
applied to crops in larger quantities and closer to delivery to 
supermarkets.”187   
According to a trade industry newspaper, the EPA increased the 
accepted level of exposure to the pesticide aldicarb “after Rhone-Poulenc 
submitted human studies conducted in Scotland,”188 and dichlorvos in 
response to “human studies submitted by Amvac Chemical.”189   
In January of 2004, an EPA official wrote a memo regarding a test on 
humans of methyl isothiocyanate, a pesticide and wood preservative.190  In 
the test, methyl isothiocyanate was sprayed into the eyes of volunteers.191  
The EPA official wrote that the study showed “little concern for the safety or 
welfare of the research subjects.” “Nonetheless,” he wrote, “I am aware of no 
barrier in current law or agency policy to your giving this study full 
consideration in your risk assessment.”192   
Even if law, regulation, and agency policies have improved sufficiently 
since 2004 to prevent unethical pesticide tests on people (an untested 
184. Steve Milloy, Commentary; A Matter of Ethics, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June
12, 2000, at 50. 
185. Id.
186. Neil Franz, Report Sets Stage for Human Testing Debate, CHEM. WEEK,
Aug. 2, 2000, at 37. 
187. Elizabeth Shogren, U.S. Will Use Once-Banned Human Tests; Pesticides:
EPA Says It Will Accept Industry Data Gathered By Giving Paid Subjects Chemical 
Doses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A1. 
188. Andrea Foster, Report on Human Toxic Testing Raises EPA Concern,
CHEM. WEEK, Aug. 5, 1998 at 15. 
189. Id.
190. Juliet Eilperin, EPA Proposal Would Allow Human Tests of Pesticides;
Draft Rule Omits Some Recommended Safeguards, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at 
A13. 
191. Id.
192. Id.
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hypothesis that welcomes analysis) they are at the mercy of the political 
climate.  And the political climate is unpredictable when unobserved. 
Currently, few know enough about the issue of pesticide testing on people 
to follow it in public affairs.  
V. Conclusion
As long as we choose to use pesticides, we owe it to ourselves and to
future generations to find out if they are safe, and that their safety has been 
established through the best possible science, acquired through ethical 
means.   
This article aims to reveal the past forty-five years of pesticide tests on 
people in order to bring this largely unknown industry (as well as its 
scientific and ethical shortcomings) into the light of day.  As the public 
desire for pesticide safety increases, so does the industry’s motivation to 
conduct such tests.  Knowing the history of pesticide tests on people, 
expanding the public discourse on the subject, and exploring its ethical 
quandaries is our best protection against unethical pesticide experiments 
on humans in the future. 
